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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
 By Susan Cavan  
 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Putin's polish tarnished 
President Vladimir Putin's tin-eared response to the Kursk tragedy unfolding in 
the Barents Sea has provoked the first sustained public criticism of his actions as 
president. As has been widely reported, Putin was vacationing at the Black Sea 
when news broke that the submarine had sunk during a large naval training 
exercise. Putin made his first television appearance to comment on the situation 
five days after the accident, which he described as "critical," but nonetheless 
refused offers of foreign assistance. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 0710 PDT, 
18 Aug 00; via C-afp@clari.net) It was another two days before he finally 
returned to Moscow and began to respond to the growing criticism of his handling 
of the rescue effort. By this time the press, leading politicians (noticeably Boris 
Nemtsov), and the public were expressing outrage, not only at the delay in 
accepting international help with the rescue, but also with Putin's reticence to 
acknowledge the seriousness of the incident through his presence in Murmansk. 
 
Explaining his absence from the scene as an effort not to interfere, Putin noted 
"the arrival of nonspecialists and high-ranking officials on the scene of a disaster 
does not help, and very often it gets in the way." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 
0710 PDT, 18 Aug 00; via C-afp@clari.net) 
 
Clearly becoming aware of the public anger with his nonchalant reaction to 
events, Putin changed the tone of his remarks and actions upon his arrival in 
Moscow. He called a meeting with top ministers, spoke of watching the rescue 
efforts "with pain in our hearts" before an assembly of Orthodox clergy, and 
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promised assistance to the families of those who perished. (AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, 0840 PDT, 20 Aug 00; via C-afp@clari.net) 
 
The naval disaster, which has apparently ended with the tragic deaths of the 
whole crew, provides a cautionary note for Putin -- even in an authoritarian-style 
democracy, public opinion still matters. The press, generally believed to be 
cowering under government control, has liberally reported the disaffection and 
distrust resonating in the population over the president's, government's and 
military's failures to respond appropriately and honestly to this crisis. 
 
No ethnic stereotyping? 
In marked contrast to his response to the Kursk incident, Putin quickly assumed 
direct presidential control of the investigation into the 8 August bombing of an 
underground walkway in Pushkin Square. (ITAR-TASS, 1824 GMT, 8 Aug 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0808, via World News Connection) He also appeared to direct 
his security and policing services, as well as the public, away from blaming 
Chechen terrorists for the explosion. While the investigation almost immediately 
seemed to view economic crime as the motive, Putin highlighted possible mafia 
involvement rather than an "ethnic" dimension, adding "One cannot put a stamp 
on an entire nation because crime has no nationality nor confession." (MOSCOW 
TIMES, 10 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Really? Lest anyone think that might suggest an easing of the brutal war in 
Chechnya, Putin did reiterate his intention to root the terrorists out of "their lair."  
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
Dagestani bombing investigation wraps up 
Five Dagestanis, labeled as Wahhabites by authorities, have been arrested and 
charged in the September 1999 bombing of an apartment building in Buinansk, 
Dagestan. Investigators from the North Caucasus Prosecutor's Office claim that 
the five carried out the bombing by order of Chechen Field Commander Ibn-ul-
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Khattab. (INTERFAX, 0619 GMT, 4 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0804, via World 
News Connection) 
 
New security regime follows bombing 
In the wake of the 8 August explosion in Pushkin Square, the Moscow police has 
instituted an aggressive new security operation, which includes widespread 
passport controls and strengthening of security in residential areas, patrols and 
inspections of garages, basements, vehicles and transportation facilities, as well 
as state institutions. By 14 August, Aleksandr Chekalin, head of the MVD's main 
directorate for maintaining public order, announced that 8,000 persons had been 
detained, 200 of them for committing crimes. (RIA, 1115 GMT, 14 Aug 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0814, via World News Connection) It is unclear why the other 7,800 
persons were detained.  
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
Will compromise cool tempers? 
At a packed Security Council session on 11 August, President Putin stressed the 
need for adequate funding of the military, as Chief of the General Staff Anatoly 
Kvashnin and Defense Minister Igor Sergeev chose not to continue their public 
squabbling over military development and policy. One reason for that may have 
been the long conversation the president had with his defense minister just prior 
to the Security Council meeting. Compromise is in the air, although it seems 
clear that the Strategic Rocket Forces will not be given the full emphasis 
requested by Sergeev. (ITAR-TASS, 1542 GMT, 11 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0811, via World News Connection) The difficulty of weighing economic realities 
when attempting military reform has stymied the Russian leadership for years, 
but rarely had it flared up as openly as the Kvashnin-Sergeev dispute. Nor have 
the true dangers of inadequate military financing been as terribly illustrated than 
in the Kursk incident.  
 
GOVERNMENT 
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President's representatives to attend meetings 
The creation of super-districts and presidential representatives to administer 
them may have seemed like an efficient way to help keep the governors in line, 
but the actual institution appears to be a bureaucratic nightmare. The 
representatives are part of the presidential team, and attend Security Council 
meetings, but they also need to co-ordinate with government members and now 
will attend government meetings as well. Their functions are not well-defined, so 
that the actual distribution of authority between regional government offices and 
the representatives will probably vary from region to region. Apparently the 
arrangement to have them at government meetings had to be negotiated 
between Vice Premier Viktor Khristenko and members of the Kremlin apparat. 
For now, the representatives will not have voting rights at the government 
sessions, but other details are not yet available. (ITAR-TASS, 1221 GMT, 11 Aug 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0811, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
The tragedy of the Barents Sea, in which 118 Russian sailors drowned in a 
damaged Russian submarine, has won broad sympathy from Russians and 
foreigners alike. Sadly, the poor preparation of the Russian Navy to handle the 
catastrophe of the Kursk has revealed how little Western aid has actually helped 
to rehabilitate the competence of the Russian state. The government's slow 
reaction has also shown how little a decade of assistance has eased suspicions 
of the West that are still prevalent in the country's political and military elite. 
 
The price of symbols 
Among the most poignant ironies of the catastrophe is that the Kursk had set sail 
to join exercises based on a scenario of armed confrontations with the very 
Western states that later tried to save its crew. The Kursk was taking part in 
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Russia's largest naval exercises of the year, operations that brought the Baltic 
Fleet together with units of the Federal Border Guard Service and Belarusian Air 
Defense. (ITAR-TASS, 7 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) The exercise was designed to 
"repel aerial attacks from the Western direction," according to Vremya novosti. 
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 9 Aug 00) 
 
Embarrassingly, the disaster fell within two weeks of Russian President Vladimir 
Putin's public declaration that a strong Russian Navy was vital to Russia's 
greatness on the world stage. Speaking in Kaliningrad on Navy Day, Putin said 
that the holiday was "dear to anyone who loves Russia, who is proud of its heroic 
past and believes in its future. The navy has always been and remains the 
symbol of a strong Russian state and a pillar of its defense capability." (ITAR-
TASS, 0834 GMT, 30 Jul 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Perhaps these naval exercises directed against putative Western foes were 
meant to augment an image abroad of a strong and independent Russia under 
an effective leader. If so, the disaster of Kursk had the opposite effect. "The 
reaction to this accident by the overall Russian leadership, the military as well, 
but Putin in particular, was catastrophic," former German Foreign Minister Klaus 
Kinkel told South West German Radio. "I think it's fair to say that the security 
partnership between Russia and the West has been damaged." (REUTERS, 
0252 PM, 21 Aug 00; via uk.news.yahoo.com) 
 
When news broke that the Russian government had waited four days before 
allowing the West to help, critics savaged the government and military for being 
stuck in a Soviet mindset of secrecy and pride. 
 
"If we had not refused Western aid at the outset the chances of saving sailors 
would have been greater," Pavel Felgenhauer, a military analyst, told Agence 
France-Presse. The delay in seeking Western aid was due, Felgenhauer said, to 
"the ideology of the Northern Fleet, the most anti-Western of all and which has no 
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other enemy than NATO, its only reason for existing." (AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, 1311 GMT, 21 Aug 2000; via www.russiatoday.com) 
 
There was little evidence, however, that the disaster had caused leading Russian 
officials to reconsider their suspicions. In a move that appeared to shift blame for 
the disaster to the West, unnamed Russian military sources alleged that 
wreckage from a foreign sub had been found near the grounded Kursk. The 
sources claimed that this confirmed suspicions that the Russian vessel had 
collided with a British or American submarine spying on its operations. (UNITED 
PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 1052 ET, 21 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) British and 
American officials strongly denied the accusations. 
 
Money for nothing? 
The Kursk disaster also coincided with renewed concern about the endemic 
corruption that has weakened the Russian state and misdirected funds meant to 
improve the lives of ordinary Russians. Indeed, some suspect that the very 
government that has based its authority on rebuilding the glory of Russia appears 
instead to have been robbing her. 
 
Military prosecutors are reported to be investigating whether from 1995 to 1996, 
officials in the Ministry of Defense embezzled $450 million from funds meant to 
procure military hardware. According to Nezavisimaya gazeta, the prosecutors 
believe that Georgy Oleinik, then director of the Main Directorate of Military 
Budget and Finances, authorized payment for nonexistent construction supplies 
from Ukraine. Three accomplices in the ministry are suspected of helping Oleinik 
carry out the fraud. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 2 Aug 00, Defense and Security; 
via lexis-nexis) 
 
Oleinik and his colleagues, all of whom remain in their posts, may well be victims 
of an attempt to smear them in the midst of power struggles within the Ministry of 
Defense. And although misappropriation of defense funds will look especially bad 
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in the wake of the Kursk disaster, Putin's government may not fear that scandals 
from the Yel'tsin era will undermine its authority. 
 
Russia's largest financial scandal, however, appears to be coming closer to 
touching Putin's inner circle. Two years after a $4.8 billion International Monetary 
Fund loan disappeared in a swirling financial crisis, investigators are pursuing a 
case that may help confirm suspicions that Mikhail Kasyanov, now Russia's 
prime minister, was involved in diverting the funds abroad. 
 
Nikolai Volkov, an investigator with the Russian Prosecutor General's Office, 
suggested late in July that he had found evidence in Switzerland to justify 
opening an investigation into the disappearance of the IMF funds. On 14 August, 
a Swiss magistrate looking into the scandal seized documents from two Swiss 
banks, one of which transferred $1.4 billion to the Bank of New York after the 
August 1998 crash. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 14 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) 
Officials at the Bank of New York have been indicted already for laundering funds 
from Russia, but no connection to the lost IMF funds has yet been proven. 
 
Leaders of the Yabloko faction in the Russian Duma have accused Kasyanov, 
who handled foreign debt negotiations for the finance ministry before his 
promotion, of helping to spirit the IMF funds to secret bank accounts abroad. 
(THE MOSCOW TIMES, 29 Jul 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Questions from a catastrophe 
What does it say about their government, Russians might well ask, that billions 
disappear from state coffers while the military is unable to save its own men? 
What kinds of politicians, they might wonder, are so suspicious of the West that 
they wait until the last minute to seek desperately needed help? Is "the greatness 
of Russia," the purported aim of everything the Kremlin pursues, so compelling a 
cause that the Russian government can indulge in symbols at the price of taking 
care of its own? 
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For relatives and friends of the drowned sailors, the political fallout of the Barents 
Sea catastrophe will never assuage their private grief. For the citizens of the 
Russian Federation, however, the disaster may well prompt some outrage at how 
their rulers have abused Western goodwill and assistance, and at what cost. 
 
Not a laughing matter  
After President Putin made his grand entrance at the G-8 Okinawa summit 
bearing a supposed pledge from Kim Jong-il to halt the North Korean missile 
development program, it seemed that Putin had officially elevated himself to the 
same diplomatic, if not economic, footing as his counterparts in the G-8. And 
although the news seemed incredible, those who had been with Putin verified his 
success. As a result, not only had Putin proven himself a capable diplomat in the 
North Korean case, but he also brought with him the backing of a considerable 
number of "rogue" states, all of which oppose US unilateralism and National 
Missile Defense (NMD) plans. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 12 Jul 00) 
 
Shortly after the summit, however, unsurprising news from Pyongyang revealed 
that Kim's comments were made "as a laughing matter" during the course of a 
conversation with Putin on "scientific and sophisticated technologies." (BBC 
MONITORING, 14 Aug 00; via RussiaToday.com) The Russian government 
responded by saying that Kim had made the remarks in the most serious tone. 
Regardless of whether Kim's joke was a hoax, though, Putin had already made 
his point to the G-8, namely that the US supposedly exaggerates the North 
Korean missile threat to suit its own needs, and that a number of non-NATO 
states across the globe share this opinion. 
 
Over the past few months, Putin has taken steps to reinvigorate Russia's ties not 
only to NATO members, but to non-NATO states as well. In particular, Putin has 
received or has plans to conduct visits with diplomats from a variety of "states of 
concern." Libya, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are counted among such states with 
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which Putin is strengthening diplomatic and, most importantly, economic ties. 
These plans suit Russia's needs politically, as a tool to counter US claims that it 
must implement an NMD to protect itself against such states, and to bolster 
Russia's economy through arms and technology sales. It seems likely that as 
long as Putin courts these countries, his ties with the US will continue to suffer; 
but Russia's international prestige may very well increase, as long as Putin limits 
the number of times he uses "joke tactics" to score a diplomatic point. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
Talk over the creation of a state council continues 
Putin has called for a state council since he came into office even if it meant 
refashioning the Federation Council, which was in fact a form of state council as 
Putin envisages it. It is unclear how a new council would be constructed or how it 
would function at this point, but most likely all 89 regions would have some 
government and parliamentary representation as well. Its purpose is wholly 
unclear, however, one can expect that it would be advisory: The last thing Russia 
needs now is yet another deliberative body with no power.  
 
Putin must be hoping to provide the regions' governors with a sense of some 
power and access so as to make them more pliable in the future and more willing 
to listen to his suggestions. But seeing that the regions' governors and 
legislatures appoint representatives to sit in the Federation Council under the 
new system recently passed, the creation of a state council would seem to be 
redundant. However, while the Russian government may be incompetent when it 
comes to running the economy, ensuring equality before the law, stabilizing the 
currency, or even saving its own citizens during times of crisis, it can build hollow 
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organizations like nobody else. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 5 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0807, via World News Connection) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Where, oh where, is the Federal Assembly? 
Imagine the doomed submarine "Kursk" sinking to the bottom of the Barents Sea 
during Boris Yel'tsin's watch. Howls from the Federal Assembly, especially the 
Duma, would have been heard from Murmansk to Vladivostok. Demands for his 
resignation, for his impeachment would have been the news headlines. But for 
some reason, this does not happen to Vladimir Putin. Indeed, not much is heard 
from the Federal Assembly, except praise for Putin's reorganization of the 
Federation Council and the senseless creation of yet another level of 
bureaucracy with the formation of federal districts. 
 
Duma Vice Speaker Vladimir Lukin explains why help was not requested as soon 
as the submarine sank. He claims that Russians most likely have superior 
technology, thereby rendering Western offers of assistance of little use. The fact 
that a leading member of the Duma can say this with a straight face is telling 
enough. (OFFICIAL KREMLIN INTERNATIONAL NEWS BROADCAST, 16 Aug 
00; Federal News Service, Inc., via lexis-nexis)  
 
And where is the people's branch -- the parliament? If the Federal Assembly 
does not institute a meaningful and penetrating investigation into the executive 
branch's response to this tragedy as well as the military's duplicity, the last 
pretense of Russian democracy will have been removed. With a little less 
concern for national honor and a little more concern for the welfare of Russia's 
own citizens, the sailors onboard the Kursk conceivably might now be at home 
with their families. In most functioning democracies, tragedies like this often elicit 
wide-ranging reforms both to prevent similar disasters from occurring, and to 
encourage greater transparency and accountability among the authorities in the 
future. No doubt the Duma will investigate, and perhaps a couple of small fry will 
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be punished, but the systemic failure of both the Russian military and civil 
authorities most likely will have no practical consequences, leaving room for 
future tragedy. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
A moribund forum? 
A summer summit at Yalta may have sounded like a good idea last spring, but 
that was before Islamic rebels invaded some CIS states and a Russian 
submarine sank mysteriously to the bottom of the Barents Sea. As a result, the 
already informal CIS Heads of State summit originally scheduled for 18-19 
August lost all semblance of order and substance. 
 
While Islamic rebels kept Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Kyrgyz President 
Askar Akaev away, President Putin arrived mid-day on Friday and stayed just 
long enough to hold a series of bilateral and multilateral meetings. Afterwards, he 
returned belatedly to Moscow to address the sub accident, but not before holding 
a hastily rescheduled meeting with the remaining heads of state. 
 
As a result of all the commotion, the get-together dissolved into less of a serious 
summit on CIS affairs than a chance for Russia to conduct smaller-scale 
meetings on a series of separate, regional issues such as Central Asian security 
and Nagorno-Karabakh. (ITAR-TASS, 1003 GMT, 18 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) 
Although these issues are of great importance for regional security, lack of a 
substantive dialogue on CIS issues once again reveals the overall lack of 
substance in CIS affairs. In fact, the presidents neither had a formal program for 
their two-hour meeting on Friday, nor did they publicize its results. (INTERFAX, 
18 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) Like their Moscow gathering in January, the informal 
meeting was held behind tightly closed doors. 
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However, their decision to opt out of a formal program was probably a good 
choice for the presidents, because at the two most recent summits they 
scrambled to prove that they had dealt with any of the items on their agenda. So 
far, the items to which they did agree earlier this year -- most notably a Free 
Trade Zone and a Joint Antiterrorism Center -- have not been implemented. 
However, by not publicizing the contents of the most recent meeting or the 
outcome of their talks, the presidents leave the public wondering what exactly 
they did in Yalta. Without any information to the contrary, it can only be assumed 
that, as usual, CIS issues were pushed aside in favor of more pressing concerns. 
Perhaps it is time to recognize that the real utility of the CIS lies not in its role as 
a viable supranational institution, but as a forum for bilateral dialogue among the 
former republics. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE  
Ukraine, meet reality; Reality, meet Ukraine 
Ukraine's leaders this month finally began to accept the inevitable: There 
appears to be no other way to settle Ukraine's gas debt to Russia than to offer 
Russia some of the country's state assets.  
 
Ukraine's problems stem from two separate but related situations. First, the 
country has fallen over $1.5 billion in arrears for gas purchased from Russia. 
Second, Ukraine has admitted to stealing up to $1 billion of additional gas from 
transit pipelines that run through the country -- gas that should have gone to 
other countries that have contracts with Russia for supplies.  
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The huge payment arrears have resulted in frequent service interruptions and 
shortages throughout the country, while the stolen gas has caused Moscow to 
consider building transit pipelines around Ukraine. This would deprive Ukraine of 
the transit fees it receives from Russia -- fees that one newspaper says total 
nearly 40 percent of Ukraine's yearly budget revenues. (2000, 4 Aug 00; BBC 
Monitoring, via FT.com) While the percentage of revenues provided by the transit 
fees is, in fact, hard to confirm, there is no question that it is very substantial. 
 
Clearly, Ukraine could not continue to escape reality by disputing the level of 
arrears and claiming an inability to stop the gas theft. Ukrainian Prime Minister 
Viktor Yushchenko put it simply. "If we fail to find a compromise with the Russian 
side," he said, "then we can say Ukraine will lose absolutely its ability to transit 
gas by 2006." (REUTERS, 1143 GMT, 21 Aug 00; via America Online)  
 
Consequently, a group of Ukrainian and Russian government experts began 
negotiating a compromise late in July. Shortly thereafter, Yushchenko quietly 
suggested that perhaps state assets would need to be surrendered, at least 
temporarily. Perhaps, he said, the country would need to grant Russia part of its 
gas transportation system. (INTERFAX, 1327 GMT, 1 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0801, via World News Connection)  
 
Reactions to this suggestion from government officials and the media were loud 
and, for the most part, negative. As details of Ukraine's offer to Russia continue 
to filter out, however, certain benefits do become obvious. While the concession 
is a definite blow to Ukraine's attempts to throw off the proverbial Russian yoke, it 
is, in fact, necessary, and could lead to more transparency, accountability and 
diversity in Ukraine's energy system. Ukraine is offering to create a joint venture 
composed of the Ukrainian gas and oil company, Naftohaz Ukrayiny, and the 
Russian gas giant, Gazprom. This joint venture would control -- and profit from -- 
Ukraine's pipeline transit system for not less than 25 years, with a portion of 
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Gazprom's profits going toward Ukraine's gas debt. After 25 years, if the debt is 
paid, control of the system, along with its profits, would revert to Ukraine.  
 
According to Kievskiye Vedomosti, which claims to be in possession of the "draft 
document being strongly lobbied for at the Cabinet of Ministers," the Ukrainian 
proposal would give Gazprom the majority stake in the venture. "To ensure real 
control over the technological process of Russian gas transit and rule out the 
possibility of unauthorized gas siphoning by Ukrainian consumers in excess of 
contractual volumes," the paper said, "the share of Gazprom in the joint venture 
is to be at least 51 per cent." (KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, 17 Aug 00; BBC 
Monitoring, via FT.com) 
 
This would, in the short term, result in a significant loss of revenue for the state's 
budget. Transit fees are currently essential to the balanced budget. In fact, 
Kievskiye Vedomosti is calling the concession "a Gazprom enslavement of the 
Ukrainian economy."  
 
Other politicians, most notably Yushchenko and National Security and Defense 
Council Secretary Yevhen Marchuk, have said that the idea is manageable. 
Marchuk, who envisions an arrangement where Gazprom would receive a one-
third share not only of Ukraine's pipeline transit system, but also its refineries, 
states, "Of course, this is a very bad situation for us, but I would not make a 
tragedy out of it." He continues, "At first glance, the idea may sound offensive. 
But what is better: to give Russia a 30 percent stake in [Ukraine's] refineries as 
well as gas and oil transporting system, ensure the viability of this system, and 
obtain profits from this deal -- or 'to fight to the bitter end' and subsequently show 
vacated (gas and oil industry) facilities to tourists?" (INTERFAX, 26 Jul 00; via 
RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report) 
 
In fact, both Marchuk and Yushchenko have suggested that by dealing with the 
situation, Ukraine will be able to move forward more successfully. Better a 
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manageable joint venture with Russia today, they suggest, than endless pressure 
and international questions tomorrow. "Quite often," Marchuk explains, "it is we 
who provide Russia with opportunities to use such unpleasant forms of influence 
on Ukraine as Russia's appeals to the IMF, the World Bank, and other 
organizations."  
 
Ukraine, Marchuk says, appears "unable to engage in rational economic 
management and, as a result, the country's image is suffering, major investment 
is being held up, and work with international financial structures in being 
complicated." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 5 Aug 00; BBC Monitoring, via 
FT.com) 
 
This agreement, for all of its faults, would in fact provide Ukraine with the ability 
to move out from under continual Russian pressure, and would allow the country 
to meet Russia on at least a somewhat more equal footing. The two gas 
companies would be partners in a newly privatized state asset, and would divide 
their profits accordingly. Ukraine would be able to face the IMF and World Bank, 
having solved its largest debt problem, and having achieved full transparency. As 
Yushchenko told New Channel Television during a live interview on 18 August, 
"This is all extremely complicated. I am happy at the moment that Ukraine is 
finding itself at such a stage in negotiations that it has put everything on the table 
and said: Dear colleagues, we want to work under a transparent scheme which 
would be understandable to all .... I am confident that government members from 
both sides will wish the same." (NEW CHANNEL TV, 1600 GMT, 18 Aug 00; 
BBC Monitoring, via FT.com) He will learn if his confidence is justified when the 
two sides meet again on 2 September in an attempt to finalize an agreement. 
Should Russia wish to end the continual squabbling over gas debt, it now has a 
viable proposal to do so. If not, it will become obvious that the goals of both sides 
are not at all the same. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Domestic patrons of the 'slave trade' 
A recent article in the liberal weekly Moskovskie novosti reveals that the FSB has 
been shielding notorious Chechen hostage takers Arbi Baraev and the brothers 
Akhmadov. The three were not listed among wanted criminals and were able to 
travel freely because they carried documentation identifying them as Russian 
intelligence operatives. That information came to light when military intelligence 
(GRU) officers issued a complaint, obtained the removal of a local FSB 
commissioner, and leaked the news to the Russian press. The paper draws the 
conclusion that "the patrons of the Chechen slave trade occupy powerful offices 
in Moscow." (8 Aug 00, www.kompromat.ru; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
This story is only the latest among several accounts which suggest that Russian 
security services have been sponsoring hostage takers in Chechnya. In May 
veteran human rights activist and parliamentarian Sergei Kovalev, in an interview 
with the author, had raised the possibility that Baraev and the Akhmadov 
brothers had FSB protection. He also questioned how it was possible for Salavdi 
Abdrazakov (who was associated with the abductions of prominent Russian and 
foreign journalists) to obtain a license from FAPSI to operate a cellular phone 
network in Chechnya. Similarly, Vyacheslav Izmailov, who engineered 
Abdrazakov's arrest in December of 1999 noted that the wanted hostage taker 
carried MVD credentials which were issued to him in Moscow. (NOVAYA 
GAZETA, 6-12 Dec 99) 
 
All this corroborates what Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov has been saying 
all along: that Russian oligarchs and special services promoted the hostage-
taking business to subvert the Chechen government and its efforts to maintain 
independence. In a recent open letter, Maskhadov says that the abductors Adam 
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Deniev (also featured in the Andrei Babitsky affair as the person to whom the 
FSB turned over the journalist -- see THE NIS OBSERVED, 29 Feb 00) and the 
gangs headed by the Saidov brothers and Sulim Yamadaev were sponsored by 
Russian Security Services. Maskhadov says that he can provide evidence of 
these and other outrages and would welcome an international inquiry into the 
matter. (OPEN LETTER BY MASKHADOV, Turkistan Bulletin, 3 Aug 00)  
 
GEORGIA 
Kidnappings in the Pankisi gorge 
Three Red Cross workers who were abducted in Georgia's Pankisi gorge on 4 
August were released a week later. The humanitarian aid workers were freed 
without ransom and without the use of force in exchange for a promise of 
immunity from prosecution. Although Georgian politicians were careful not to 
identify the perpetrators, some media reported that they were Kistin Chechens, 
who are native to Pankisi gorge (which borders Chechnya). According to these 
accounts, the captors sought to secure the release of friends from a Georgian 
prison. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 13 Aug 00, and SEGODNYA, 14 Aug 00; 
via lexis-nexis)  
 
In a 14 August interview President Eduard Shevardnadze thanked all the 
residents of the area, especially the "guests" (refugees) from Chechnya, for 
helping the authorities resolve the situation. He went on to comment that the 
incident confirms that "foreign" forces are not needed to police the area and the 
introduction of a foreign military presence could lead to a widening of the war. 
(GEORGIAN RADIO, 0600 GMT, 14 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0814, via World 
News Connection) 
 
More mujahadin visions 
On a recent visit to the OSCE border observation post at Shatili, Liviu Bota, 
Romania's ambassador to the OSCE who was previously the UN secretary-
general's special representative for the Abkhaz conflict, said that the mission had 
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not detected any unauthorized border crossings. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 11 Aug 
00) The mission, which has been in place since January, has 42 monitors (12 at 
any one time) at the Shatili crossing, which was chosen because it is the only 
place along the border where trucks with crates could pass. (www.osce.org) This 
has not stopped the Russian military and media from issuing unsubstantiated 
claims. A group of Afghan mujahadin "is in combat readiness in Georgia's 
Akhmet district" Tass reported, based on information from unnamed sources in 
the joint group of forces. (ITAR-TASS, 11 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) The Georgian 
foreign ministry issued a denial on 14 August.  
 
Really on their way out? 
While it is certainly good news that the Russian side is making good on some of 
its Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) obligations, Moscow is still 
dragging its feet on all the other obligations it undertook at the OSCE summit in 
Istanbul. The Georgian side speaks of the Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) 
removal as the first stage and the base closings as the second stage in the 
process of a complete Russian withdrawal from the country by the end of 2002.  
 
Since 5 August, Russia removed tanks and other weaponry (49 pieces) from its 
Vaziani base to comply with the ceiling stipulated under the CFE. The next batch 
of Russian military equipment (61 items) will be pulled out of Georgia in 
September. A total of 335 TLE units will be withdrawn and another 1116 TLE 
destroyed in Georgia. (INTERFAX, 20 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) The US state 
department has promised to cover the costs of the withdrawal to the tune of $10 
million while the UK will contribute $100,000.  
 
During the Istanbul summit Russia and Georgia stipulated that Russia would 
reduce its level of equipment in Georgia not to exceed 153 tanks, 241 armored 
combat vehicles (ACVs) and 140 artillery systems by 31 December 2000. All the 
treaty-limited equipment has to be removed from Vaziani and Gudauta by the 
same date. The Vaziani and Gudauta bases were to be disbanded and destroyed 
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by 1 July 2000. The duration and modalities of the functioning of the remaining 
bases (at Batumi and Akhalkalaki) are to be decided before the end of the year. 
However, the treaty leaves two loopholes, which the Russian side has been 
exploiting. First, it leaves open the possibility of joint use of the military facilities 
and infrastructure of the disbanded Russian military bases. Second, it speaks of 
unspecified "military facilities within the territory of Georgia," the fate of which (in 
addition to the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases) will be decided during the year 
2000. (www.osce.org) 
 
The last round of Russian-Georgian talks produced a schedule for withdrawing 
Russian TLE, but differences persist on the question of closing the bases. The 
commander of the Russian Group of Forces in the Transcaucasus, Vladimir 
Andreev, claimed the airport at Vaziani is needed to support the activities of the 
remaining bases. Therefore, the Russian side wants to have joint use of the 
airfield even after the base is dismantled. (INTERFAX, 2 Aug and 31 Jul 00; via 
lexis-nexis) Since Russia has used the airfield to supply Abkhaz rebels and 
sneak coup plotters out of the country, it is hardly surprising that the Georgian 
side would prefer to have complete control over the airfield.  
 
A recent visit by a NATO delegation which examined Georgia's air defense 
capabilities spawned rumors that the Vaziani base would be turned over to 
NATO after the Russians pull out. Georgian Foreign Minister Irakli 
Menagharishvili rejected these ideas as sheer "fantasy." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 8 
Aug 00) 
 
In a similar effort to hold onto a base they have promised to vacate, the Russians 
demand that Gudauta, which is situated in Abkhazia, should be designated a 
peacekeeping facility. (WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, 11 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) 
For his part, Abkhaz President Vladislav Ardzinba told a reporter that his people 
would sooner "lie down in front of Russian tanks" than let them leave. (IWPR 
CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, 18 Aug 00) In view of the presence of 
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Russian "peacekeepers" in Abkhazia, the phraseology seems melodramatic, but 
the argument could prove effective in stalling the Russian pullout. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Nicholas Burk 
 
Yet another summer of insurgency 
Violence has erupted again in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) appears to be back in full force, and it is 
unclear who its fellow extremists are -- although Osama bin Laden and the 
Taliban are being rehashed as the Wahhabis du jour. This year's round of 
insurgency is producing a few surprises, ranging from rumors that Pakistani 
boats were ferrying insurgents to the front, to an announcement by Uzbek 
authorities that the February 1999 Tashkent bomber has reappeared in the 
mountains of southern Uzbekistan. It seems that the IMU is conducting its 
infiltration in "waves" with the ultimate goal of destabilizing the three republics to 
ensure a smooth flow of drugs throughout the region. The Central Asian 
republics and Russia are mobilizing furiously, and preemptive strikes on Tajik or 
Afghan territory may be just around the corner. 
 
Right on cue, but with a twist 
The IMU has started its quest for the Fergana Valley for the second straight 
summer. The lead-up to this drama has been anything but surprising. For the 
past several months, events such as the stern words of the Shanghai-5 summit, 
Kyrgyzstan's announcement that it was "ready" for an IMU invasion in June, and 
the red-handed capture of various IMU officers with maps of the mountainous 
terrain have telegraphed that another invasion would be forthcoming.  
 
In this year's Central Asian summer classic, the IMU has employed some 
different tactics. Last year, insurgents invaded Kyrgyzstan's Batken province via 
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Tajikistan and held ground for nearly two months. This time the IMU began its 
invasion by the same route, sending through 100 troops on 11 August. Kyrgyz 
security forces claimed that they encircled the militants and eliminated them with 
air strikes -- suffering as many as 40 casualties although the real figure is far 
from clear. (ITAR-TASS, 13 Aug 00: FBIS-SOV-2000-0813, via World News 
Connection) At the same time, the IMU invaded southern Uzbekistan through a 
different route -- attacking three villages and blocking a strategic highway in 
Uzbekistan's Surkhandarya region, also with 100 troops. (VREMYA, 8 Aug 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0811, via World News Connection) According to Major General 
Yuri Filonenko, Uzbek forces have also destroyed the invaders. In a tradition of 
grand Uzbek rhetoric, the three villages were "evacuated" immediately because 
of both terrorism and the danger of imminent landslides. (BBC SUMMARY OF 
WORLD BROADCASTS, 19 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
These two 100-troop invasions into Kyrgyzstan's Batken province and 
Uzbekistan's Surkhandarya province appear to constitute only a small diversion 
by the IMU. In Uzbekistan, insurgents have been sneaking into the mountains at 
least since last winter, and may be laying a groundwork for a much larger assault 
on the Fergana Valley. Not only is Tashkent's quick proclamation of victory over 
the current wave of rebels suspect, but it is probable that Uzbek forces will have 
to deal with this problem for the foreseeable future. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 
16 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) In Kyrgyzstan, small IMU formations of 40 to 50 rebels 
are reportedly lurking near several mountain passes on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border, 
while insurgents on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border number between 700-800. (BBC 
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, 17 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
For the three republics, the worst is yet to come. As many as 2,000 IMU rebels 
are reportedly massing on the Afghan-Tajik and Afghan-Uzbek borders. 
(INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 20 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) The IMU appears to 
be well-trained, knowledgeable of the geography, and even may possess some 
attack helicopters in its arsenal. (IZVESTIA, 18 Aug 00, via lexis-nexis) The 
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IMU's goals and motives are not crystal clear -- it is hard to determine whether 
they are truly driven by Islam, or they want to create a blanket of instability to 
allow for their lucrative drug trade. Whatever their motives, they have the 
manpower and training to generate a great deal of instability in Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. 
 
Separating bizarre rhetoric from bizarre facts 
Between the shadowy potential allies of the IMU and the Shanghai-5's 
Machiavellian use of instability to cement a Moscow-centered security system in 
Central Asia, the latest round of violence has produced a few interesting but 
suspect factoids. First, it has been reported "by military sources in Dushanbe" 
that Pakistan has supplied IMU troops with boats to guide them safely across 
rivers separating northern Afghanistan and southern Tajikistan. (ITAR-TASS, 13 
Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0813, via World News Connection) The implications of 
this are potentially very large and could pit Pakistan against the Shanghai-5. But 
the allegations raise a few questions: most importantly, does "Pakistan" mean 
the Pakistani government, the intelligence services (ISI) or non-governmental 
elements under the control of the ruling regime?  
 
The potential for fabricating sensationalism linked to this conflict certainly exists. 
For example, even the Russian foreign ministry chided Interfax over sloppy 
reporting after an article suggested that the Taliban had invaded sovereign 
Uzbek territory with two army units to support the IMU. (INTERFAX, 9 Aug 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0809, via World News Connection) Allegations that the Taliban 
has donated several helicopters to IMU leader Juma Namangani are more 
plausible. But what is to be made of the strange allegations of the Uzbek chief 
prosecutor's office that the mastermind behind the 1999 bombings in Tashkent, 
Ulugbek Babadzhanov, has reappeared and is fighting in Kyrgyzstan? Uzbek 
authorities did not reveal where they obtained this information, but given Islam 
Karimov's tendency to use Islamist movements for his own political ends, one 
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can assume that this allegation may be a "gateway" for Uzbekistan to become 
involved militarily in the wider Central Asian conflict. 
 
Towards the redrawing of Central Asian borders? 
Swift and massive action by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Russia could 
occur at any time, especially to preempt IMU reinforcements as they stream into 
Central Asia from Afghanistan. The assertion of greater Russian influence in the 
region, perhaps under the auspices of the Shanghai-5, seems likely. It is even 
possible that Russia may consider a direct military presence in Kyrgyzstan given 
the incursions into Batken province. (BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD 
BROADCASTS, 17 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) However, the biggest loser in the 
equation may be Tajikistan. Uzbek rhetoric has been remarkably quiet on this 
point. On the other hand, Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev has lashed out at 
Dushanbe's inability to secure its territory, and has called for joint military action 
against targets in Tajikistan. Akaev has proclaimed: "...we have to take a 
decision to destroy their [the IMU's] bases in Tajikistan to liquidate the seat of 
terrorism in Central Asia. We have to join forces to finally destroy rebels and 
those bases which feed them ...." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 19 Aug 00; via 
lexis-nexis)  
 
Akaev's wrath toward Tajikistan is understandable given the imminent danger the 
IMU poses to his country. At the same time, his militant calls for action are 
somewhat surprising, considering Kyrgyzstan's position as a relatively weak 
Central Asian state. Preeminent Central Asian power Uzbekistan meanwhile has 
been quiet -- only withdrawing its ambassador from Dushanbe after the incursion 
into Surkhandarya province. (ITAR-TASS, 9 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0809, via 
World News Connection) Akaev is certainly conscious that its powerful Uzbek 
neighbor may consider stepping into Kyrgyzstan to take care of the IMU problem 
itself. By blaming Dushanbe, he may be trying to divert Tashkent's attention to 
Tajikistan. After a high-level meeting between Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik and Russian 
officials on 20 August, collective military action against targets in Tajikistan and 
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Afghanistan are likely. This chapter in the IMU story has just begun. It remains to 
be seen whether the sovereign borders of Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan remain intact 
before it finishes. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Much energy expended on NRG deal 
The Estonian government has spent an incredible amount of time debating, 
demanding and defending its agreement to sell a 49-percent share in Eesti 
Energia's (Estonian Energy's) Narva Power Stations to the US company NRG 
Energy. When the dust settled, it was quite clear that the government does not 
have a mandate for this accord: Rather, the agreement has served as a lightning 
rod around which gather political opponents, members of the management board 
of Eesti Energia, and much of the general population. And, to make sure that 
tempers remain on the boil, the government has managed to stir up additional 
antagonisms with heavy-handed behavior, including an initial refusal to release 
the terms of the deal and a planned memorandum demanding that Eesti 
Energia's management board members swallow their criticism and endorse the 
government plan ... or else.  
 
While some opposition, to be sure, stemmed from the fact that the state-owned 
utility was for sale at all, most of the outcry resulted from the manner in which the 
sale was being held. At the end of June, President Lennart Meri urged the 
government to rethink the transaction, which he sees as belonging under 
parliament's -- not the government's -- purview. (INTERFAX, 1546 GMT, 27 Jun 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0627, via World News Connection) Business leaders and 
consumer groups also voiced opposition to the agreement, particularly to the 
inevitable increase in energy prices that will result. 
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In a move of underwhelming diplomatic finesse, word came from the finance 
ministry that Economics Minister Mihkel Parnoja and Finance Minister Siim 
Kallas planned to issue written instructions to the Eesti Energia supervisory 
council mandating support of the sale. "By this, the ministers demand that 
members of the council vote in agreement with the government decision and it is 
an order on behalf of the state," finance ministry advisor Daniel Vaarik explained. 
The chairman of the supervisory council, Juri Kao, said he doubted that such 
instructions, if issued, would override any personal opposition of council 
members. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 11 Aug 00)  
 
Such government heavy-handedness is especially noteworthy primarily because 
it wasn't necessary: Council objections focused on aspects of the agreement that 
were still under negotiation, such as the location of energy station renovations 
and details of energy prices. And representatives from NRG had accepted the 
final conditions; at the time of the possible memorandum showdown, the 
agreements were being sent for translation. (ETA NEWS AGENCY, 1620 GMT, 1 
Aug 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) But few persons 
outside of government and the council were privy to the details, as Parnoja had 
ordered complete secrecy concerning the negotiations. (BNS, 1658 GMT, 7 Aug 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0807, via World News Connection)  
 
That secrecy had prompted a lawsuit by opposition leaders Edgar Savisaar and 
Villu Reiljan, who claimed that a government protocol was unconstitutional and 
that, like the president, they saw the responsibility for any such sale as resting 
with parliament. And, although the Tallinn Administrative Court denied the suit, a 
larger contingent from the opposition subsequently proposed to oust the 
economics minister. "We have no confidence in ... Parnoja, not only because of 
what we know about his activity, but also because of what we do not know," the 
cover letter to the motion explained. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 
1300 GMT, 14 Aug 00) While Parnoja survived the 
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threat to his seat (the no-confidence vote had the support of 45 members of 
parliament, short of the 51 votes needed, and so was tabled), Riigikogu deputies 
grilled Prime Minister Mart Laar for hours on 18 August. The session ended when 
there was no quorum. (ESTONIAN TELEVISION, 1645 GMT, 14 Aug 00; BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
After weeks of often-acrimonious debate, there was little surprise when the 
research firm EMOR announced a recent poll had shown that two-thirds of the 
Estonian population opposed the sale. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 17 Aug 00; via 
lexis-nexis) Regardless, the agreement is expected to be signed this week. 
 
LATVIA 
The devil is still in the details 
Latvia's language law once again has become a subject of international 
conversation as the government works to develop an implementation program for 
the law it passed following considerable external scrutiny. 
 
While Russian organizations staged yet more demonstrations (protesting drafts 
that had yet to be completed), European Human Rights Court Justice Egils Levits 
met with members of the Latvian Human Rights Office to review the proposed 
regulations. The consensus from the meeting was that there was no reason to 
believe the implementation program under discussion would contravene 
international standards. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 
12 Jul 00) 
 
The now-completed draft regulations have been submitted to Organization for 
Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner for National 
Minorities Max van der Stoel. The director of the state Human Rights Office, 
Olafs Bruvers, told BNS that none of Stoel's recommendations had been 
rejected, although some of the commissioner's proposals were only partially 
included. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 9 Aug 00) 
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While Stoel reviews the program, the campaign for approval continues. Hoping to 
avoid an OSCE rejection, Latvian Minister of Justice Ingrida Labucka sent a letter 
to the commissioner explaining some of the reasoning behind the government's 
decision not to heed all of Stoel's concerns. (LETA, 1643 GMT, 16 Aug 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0816, via World News Connection) 
 
Questions over language fluency continue to demonstrate that all the kinks have 
not been ironed out as yet. The Strasbourg Human Rights Court has agreed to 
review a complaint from a Latvian resident from Daugavpils whose fluency 
certification was not accepted by the Central Election Commission. That rejection 
prevented Ingrida Podkolzina from running in the 1998 parliamentary elections. 
According to Baltic News Service, forged language proficiency certificates often 
turn up in Daugavpils. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 
19 Jul 00) 
 
LITHUANIA 
Bean counters of the world, unite! 
Work has begun on gathering data necessary to put into effect the Seimas' highly 
controversial bill demanding compensation from Russia for damages incurred 
during decades of Soviet occupation. 
 
A commission headed by Deputy Minister of Justice Rasa Budbergyte said one 
problem has resulted from contradictory data. A calculation of damages based on 
statistics from the USSR would only account for material damage, she said, and 
not all of that data are reliable anyway. However, United Nations' methods would 
account for other kinds of losses as well. The government has asked ministries to 
supply, by 10 September, data which can be verified by archival material and 
statistics. The commission hopes to present its information to Russia, the UN, 
and the Council of Europe by 1 November. "We will start thinking about 
negotiations after hearing a response from Russia," she said. (BNS, 1005 GMT, 
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11 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0811) One can only imagine what that response will 
be. 
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